Article ID: | iaor19961745 |
Country: | Germany |
Volume: | 25 |
Issue: | 1 |
Start Page Number: | 113 |
End Page Number: | 134 |
Publication Date: | Jan 1996 |
Journal: | International Journal of Game Theory |
Authors: | Zarzuelo J., Ruis L., Valenciano F. |
The nucleolus and the prenucleolus are solution concepts for TU games based on the excess vector that can be associated to any payoff vector. Here the authors explore some solution concepts resulting from a payoff vector selection based also on the excess vector but by means of an assessment of their relative fairness different from that given by the lexicographical order. They take the departure consisting of choosing the payoff vector which minimizes the variance of the resulting excesses of the coalitions. This procedure yields two interesting solution concepts, both a prenucleolus-like and a nucleolus-like notion, depending on which set is chosen to set up the minimizing problem: the set of efficient payoff vectors or the set of imputations. These solution concepts, which, paralleling the prenucleolus and the nucleolus, the authors call least square prenucleolus and least square nucleolus, are easy to calculate and exhibit nice properties. Different axiomatic characterizations of the former are established some of them by means of consistency for a reasonable reduced game concept.