| Article ID: | iaor19961738 |
| Country: | Germany |
| Volume: | 25 |
| Issue: | 1 |
| Start Page Number: | 35 |
| End Page Number: | 41 |
| Publication Date: | Jan 1996 |
| Journal: | International Journal of Game Theory |
| Authors: | Evangelista F., Raghavan T. |
| Keywords: | Nash theory and methods |
The set of correlated equilibria for a bimatrix game is a closed, bounded, convex set containing the set of Nash equilibria. The authors show that every extreme point of a maximal Nash set is an extreme point of the above convex set. They also give an example to show that this result is not true in the payoff space, i.e. there are games where no Nash equilibrium payoff is an extreme point of the set of correlated equilibrium payoffs.