The consistency principle for games in strategic form

The consistency principle for games in strategic form

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Article ID: iaor19961736
Country: Germany
Volume: 25
Issue: 1
Start Page Number: 13
End Page Number: 34
Publication Date: Jan 1996
Journal: International Journal of Game Theory
Authors: ,
Keywords: Nash theory and methods
Abstract:

The authors start with giving an axiomatic characterization of the Nash equilibrium (NE) correspondence in terms of consistency, converse consistency, and one-person rationality. Then axiomatizations are given of the strong NE correspondence, the coalition-proof NE correspondence and the semi-strong NE. In all these characterizations consistency and suitable variants of converse consistency play a role. Finally, the dominant NE correspondence is characterized. The authors also indicate how to generalize the present results to Bayesian and extensive games.

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