Article ID: | iaor19961736 |
Country: | Germany |
Volume: | 25 |
Issue: | 1 |
Start Page Number: | 13 |
End Page Number: | 34 |
Publication Date: | Jan 1996 |
Journal: | International Journal of Game Theory |
Authors: | Tijs S., Peleg B. |
Keywords: | Nash theory and methods |
The authors start with giving an axiomatic characterization of the Nash equilibrium (NE) correspondence in terms of consistency, converse consistency, and one-person rationality. Then axiomatizations are given of the strong NE correspondence, the coalition-proof NE correspondence and the semi-strong NE. In all these characterizations consistency and suitable variants of converse consistency play a role. Finally, the dominant NE correspondence is characterized. The authors also indicate how to generalize the present results to Bayesian and extensive games.