The lattice of core (sub)matchings in a two-sided matching market

The lattice of core (sub)matchings in a two-sided matching market

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Article ID: iaor1995685
Country: United States
Volume: 19
Issue: 3
Start Page Number: 603
End Page Number: 617
Publication Date: Aug 1994
Journal: Mathematics of Operations Research
Authors:
Abstract:

The paper considers the two-sided matching model of Demange and Gale. Given a suitable partial ordering and a correct definition of ‘matching’, it shows the set of core matchings is (under a nondegeneracy assumption) always a lattice. The results parallel the ‘set of core matchings is a lattice’ theorem for the marriage market of Gale and Shapley.

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