Some concepts of non-myopic equilibria in games with finite strategy sets and their properties

This paper presents a special class of equilibria in finite strategy noncooperative games, which are extensions of the traditional Nash equilibrium solution. An underlying role in these equilibria play the assumed extended models of player’s rationality principles which admit their non-myopic behaviour. The crucial idea is that players possessing some information about their opponents and the game itself can forecast the consequences of their choices by analyzing the ‘move-countermove’ possible sequences and accordingly predict the stability of game outcomes. The class of discussed equilibria besides the classical Nash equilibrium includes all the solutions considered in metagame and hypergame theories, and its determinants allow for a useful characterization of new potential equilibria concepts in modeled real-life conflicts. For specific equilibrium concepts, their individual properties are discussed and some analytical characterizations are provided. The paper concludes with the description of a computer-based procedure developed for calculating different kinds of generalized equilibrium points. Possible applications of this procedure within simulation and gaming are briefly discussed.