The symmetric Volunteer’s dilemma game (VOD) models a situation in which each of N actors faces the decision of either producing a step-level collective good (action ‘C’) or freeriding (‘D’). One player’s cooperative action suffices for producing the collective good. Unilateral cooperation yields a payoff U for D-players and U-K for the cooperative player(s). However, if all actors decide for ‘freeriding’, each player’s payoff is zero (U>K>0). In this article, an essential modification is discussed. In an asymmetric VOD, the interest in the collective good and/or the production costs (i.e. U or K) may vary between actors. The generalized asymmetric VOD is similar to market entry games. Alternative hypotheses about the behaviour of subjects are derived from a game-theoretical analysis. They are invesgitaged in an experimental setting. The application of the mixed Nash-equilibrium concept yields a rather counter-intuitive prediction which apparently contradicts the empirical data. The predictions of the Harsanyi-Selten-theory and Schelling’s ‘focal point theory’ are in better accordance with the data. However, they do not account for the ‘diffusion-of-responsibility-effect’ also observable in the context of an asymmetric VOD game.
