Stable matchings, optimal assignments, and linear programming

Stable matchings, optimal assignments, and linear programming

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Article ID: iaor1994814
Country: United States
Volume: 18
Issue: 4
Start Page Number: 803
End Page Number: 828
Publication Date: Nov 1993
Journal: Mathematics of Operations Research
Authors: , ,
Keywords: programming: linear
Abstract:

Vande Vate described the polytope whose extreme points are the stable (core) matchings in the Marriage Problem. Rothblum simplified and extended this result. This paper explores a corresponding linear program, its dual and consequences of the fact that the dual solutions have an unusually direct relation to the primal solutions. This close relationship allows us to provide simple proofs both of Vande Vate and Rothblum’s results and of other important results about the core of marriage markets. These proofs help explain the structure shared by the marriage problem (without sidepayments) and the assignment game (with sidepayments). The paper further explores ‘fractional’ matchings, which may be interpreted as lotteries over possible matches or as time-sharing arrangements. It shows that those fractional matchings in the Stable Marriage Polytope form a lattice with respect to a partial ordering that involves stochastic dominance. Thus, all expected utility functions corresponding to the same ordinal preferences will agree on the relevant comparisions. Finally, the paper provides linear programming proofs of slightly stronger versions of known incentive compatibility results.

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