A strong dominance for games lacking in core or in stable sets

A strong dominance for games lacking in core or in stable sets

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Article ID: iaor19881166
Country: Belgium
Volume: 30
Start Page Number: 173
End Page Number: 176
Publication Date: May 1988
Journal: Cahiers du Centre d'tudes de Recherche Oprationnelle
Authors:
Keywords: stochastic dominance
Abstract:

The problem of empty core has been remedied by extensions based on relaxations of the condition that no coalition of the core can improve alone its payment. The present note suggests another way, based on a strong dominance. Besides, in such a way it is possible to generalize the stable sets in order to solve games lacking in the von Neumann-Morgenstern solution.

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